NEWSLETTER



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ASSOC. for ANTHROPOLOGY in MICRONESIA

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A S S O C I A T I O N for A N T H R O P O L O G Y in M I C R O N E S I A

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Owing to delays in publication recently, Volume 1 of the Newsletter will consist only of Nos. 1-3 (Mar, June, Sept). Volume 2 begins with this special issue: No. 1, Spring 1973.

AAM was founded in 1971 by a group of American anthropologists who are actively interested in studying (1) the traditional Micronesian cultures and languages, and (2) the changes that are taking place today. This same group is equally concerned about applying such research to contemporary problems in Micronesia, in cooperation with the Micronesian people and their leaders.

The term Micronesia, as used here, will be interpreted by most readers as synonymous with the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Some will also include Guam. And still others, quite legitimately, will add Nauru and the Gilbert Islands. These areas are all commonly regarded as Micronesian in the usual three-part view of Oceania. They appear to have possibly even more in common, economically and politically, in the years immediately ahead.

Toward fulfilling its stated purpose, AAM proposes:

1) to publish a quarterly Newsletter that will be a forum for the exchange of information and the expression of opinion,
2) to cooperate with other organizations having related purposes, such as MARC, SPC, ASAO,
3) to convene conferences and symposia, and
4) to engage in such other activities as will encourage and maintain a favorable climate for anthropological research and its application to current problems in Micronesia.

Membership is open to any person who shares an interest in these goals of AAM. No one will be excluded by reference to professional qualification, nationality, or non-affiliation with anthropology as an academic pursuit. Thus, AAM invites students as well as professionals, other nationalities and Micronesians as well as Americans, and persons from other fields of endeavor as well as those engaged in anthropology.

The AAM Constitution, which was approved in 1971 by the founding members, was produced in its entirety in the September 1972 issue (vol. 1, no. 3) of the Newsletter.

The Newsletter Editor invites information about your own activities as these relate to a broad definition of anthropology in Micronesia. Each issue of the Newsletter will inform readers about ongoing research; applications of research; plans for future work; new publications; and newsworthy happenings in Micronesia that appear to be relevant to anthropological interests. Special attention will be given to the exchange of views about anthropological research; how its results may be applied more directly to current problems in Micronesia; suggestions for needed studies of Micronesian cultures and languages; and ways and means by which anthropologists and Micronesians can work more closely for mutual benefit.

EDITOR'S COMMENT

This issue of the AAM Newsletter is devoted entirely to reproduction of two papers presented in the "Across Generations" symposium during the 32nd annual meeting of the SOCIETY FOR APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY at Tucson, Arizona, April 12-14, 1973. Both papers are concerned with the history of anthropology in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands since World War II, when administration of the islands by the U. S. Government began.

The general purpose and format of the "Across Generations" symposium is described in Abstracts (32nd Ann. Meet., Soc. for Appl. Anthr., 1973):

> "Recently, a number of books have appeared on applied anthropology reviewing the Classic cases (e.g. Vicos, Fox Project, etc.). The record for many of these cases is surprisingly incomplete. Those who were directly involved ir their formulation and execution are growing old; some have died. Furthermore, comparability between cases is made difficult by the lack of a standardized format for case reporting. A definite need exists (1) to evaluate and complete the case records for these cases, and (2) to develop a convention for reporting future cases. This symposium will begin the effort to meet these needs. Several classic cases have been selected for examination. A young applied scholar and an older applied anthropologist, who was directly involved in a specific case, have been teamed to examine the case. The younger team member will critically evaluate the case's historical record, while the older member will answer the critique and fill in the record. From these critiques the symposium participants will explore the possibilities and requirements for a standardized case reporting format" (p. 1).

The symposium was held all day on April 14. Co-chairmen were Barry R. Bainton and Edward H. Spicer (both U Arizona). The classic cases reviewed by representatives of the younger and older generations were:

1. Committee on Food Habits. HAROLD NELSON (CSU, Chico) and RHODA METRAUX (New York City).
2. War Relocation Authority. ROBERT GRANINGER and EDWARD H. SPICER (both U Arizona).
3. Bureau of Indian Affairs Personality Study. JAMES OFFICER (U Arizona) and LAURA THOMPSON (New York City).
4. Fox Project. ALLYN G. SPENCE (U Arizona) and FREDERICK GEARING (SUNY, Buffalo).
5. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. ROGER GALE (UC, Berkeley) and LEONARD MASON (U Hawaii).
6. American Indian Claims Cases. RONALD GITECK (U Arizona) and NANCY LURIE (Milwaukee Public Museum).
7. Vicos Case. BARRY R. BAINTON (U Arizona) and HENRY DOBYNS (Prescott College).

Certain common issues emerged during discussion which demand further examination. Plans are underway to continue deliberation by symposium participants. Permission has been given to reproduce the Trust Territory papers by Gale and Mason in the AAM Newsletter for wider dissemination and discussion among those most concerned with the role of anthropology in Micronesia.

Your reactions are invited for inclusion in future issues of the AAM Newsletter. Send them to the Newsletter Editor.

ANTHROPOLOGICAL COLONIALISM IN MICRONESIA

by

ROGER GALE
(Friends of Micronesia, Berkeley, California)

"Virtually all anthropological activity in Micronesia has been concerned with 'what to do with the natives.' This problem-oriented perspective was precipitated in the first place by America's need to effectively control its new colony, but has become a hallmark of anthropology in Micronesia, continuing to be a popular preoccupation of anthropology today. Anthropologists originally came to Micronesia as agents of the United States government working in a variety of roles that were created and supported by the Navy and the Department of the Interior. This anthropological handmaidenry has never been critically reviewed.

"Although there has been a great deal of debate in recent years about the ethics of government and corporate sponsorship of research (Horowitz, 1967; Beals, 1969; Sjoberg, 1967), there has been little attention paid to the more basic question which gets to the heart of all so-called pure and applied anthropology --the ethics of uninvited anthropological intervention in colonized nations. Whether or not anthropologists are in the direct employ of action-oriented government agencies, this remains the central question. This critique describes the history of anthropological involvement in Micronesia but its more basic purpose is to examine anthropology's dependence on and alliance with the interests of the American colonial administration of Micronesia.

"In World War II, social science came into prominence as an ally of the American military establishment. The OSS is the best known example of this but social science (particularly anthropology) played a part in the occupation of Japan and in the operation of Japanese-American detention camps. Social science also played a part in the occupation and consolidation of power in Micronesia. Anthropologists and other social scientists collected data to prepare for the occupation and they trained military government officers. After the occupation the role of anthropology expanded greatly. There were four major organizational arrangements through which anthropologists worked: (1) as researchers for the United States Commercial Company's Economic Survey of Micronesia, (2) as teachers at the School of Naval Administration at Stanford, (3) as researchers for the Coordinated Investigation of Micronesian Anthropology (CIMA), and (4) as consultants, district/staff anthropologists and administrators with the Navy and Interior Departments in thefield.

"Whether acting as administrators, teachers, researchers or government informants, anthropologists in Micronesia have been concerned with purposively oriented knowledge aimed at the maintenance of a stable society, the introduction of norms deemed valuable by the U. S. colonial administration and especially social and political institutions whose purpose has been to make Micronesians dependent on continuing U. S. largesse and authority. The record is quite clear in this regard--anthropologists have acted to implement decisions of the U. S. military and civilian regimes (e.g. Mason, 1948b), they have acted as hired spies gaining anthropological confidences for political purposes (see Barnett, 1956) and in cases where the occupying authority chose to ignore circumstantial needs, anthropologists acted as virtual political dictators (Gladwin, 1950).

"Among researchers employed by CIMA, there was a great deal of esoteric research published which was of little or no administrative or operative value despite the fact that the research program was created at the behest of and funded largely by the Navy. Nevertheless, even these 'basic' research activities should not be dropped from sight since CIMA probably remains to this day the largest single anthropological project ever undertaken. It is important also because some

FRIENDS OF MICRONESIA

Program

1. We support the Micronesian struggle for self-determination and have pledged ourselves to support the Micronesian people in any way possible.
2. We provide information to create a public awareness on the part of the American people concerning Micronesia and the exploitative administration of Micronesia by the United States Government.
3. We work to prevent the destruction of Micronesia by "developers" who have no sensitivity to Micronesian needs nor to the adaptability of traditional economic and political ways.
4. We work to prevent the resurgence of American militarism in Micronesia and support attempts to end American aggression in other parts of Asia.
5. We work against American racist policies as exhibited in the destruction of Micronesian islands, the forced removal of populations, the radioactive contamination of Marshallese and the discriminatory economic and political power of American officials.
6. We work with many international groups who seek a peaceful world free of armed aggression and nuclear weapons.
7. We do not attempt to dictate policy to the Micronesian people nor do we prescribe solutions to the problem of Micronesian "development."
8. We do not believe that anthropologists, political scientists, economists and other academics are specially qualified to dictate policy or evaluate events but we do believe that academics, especially those who have profited from their work in Micronesia, have an obligation to support Micronesian desires and to provide information and services when requested.

Newsletter

1. Friends of Micronesia, 2325 McKinley Avenue, Berkeley, California 94703. (415) 849-1715.
2. Published quarterly, with additional supplements when conditions warrant.
3. Roger W. Gale, Editor, with the help of a lot of friends.
4. Subscriptions: $5 a year; foreign air mail postage is $2 additional; institutional and government subscriptions are $12. Bulk rates available.

—Quoted from the masthead of Friends of Micronesia Newsletter, (Spring 1973, vol. 3, no. 2)

(GALE, continued)
of the CIMA researchers stayed on to become employees of the administration.

"The role of anthropologists as administrators and government agents waned by the mid-1950s. Today only a couple of social scientists doing work in Micronesia are supported by action-oriented agencies (Moos, Meller).* Nevertheless, concern for the solution of political problems remains a major enterprise among anthropologists. Part of this is tied to the need to keep the field open for research, especially so when, as at the present, there seems to be a new surge of field work in Micronesia.

"In recent years, however, anthropologists have continued to play political roles as they did in the past. Singleton and Mahony were members of a Stanford Research Institute contract team which, under Interior sponsorship, drew up a comprehensive educational plan as

*Felix Moos, anthropologist, University of Kansas, has Defense Department ARPA funds for the study of rapid change in Micronesia. Meller has AID money for the study of leadership in the Pacific.

(GALE, continued)
a spinoff of the Solomon Report which recommended an Americanized educational system for Micronesia. Other anthropologists (Mason, Wilson, Smith, and Mahony) were consultants to Hawaii Architects and Engineers who designed master plans for transforming Micronesia into a dependent cash economy. In addition, at recent anthropology meetings a number of papers have been presented on political development (e.g. Dahlquist, 1972; Moos, 1972; Lingenfelter, 1972; Mihaly, 1972; Mason, 1972). Hughes and Lingenfelter are editing a book on political development which will contain many of these papers. A new organization, the Association for Anthropology in Micronesia, publishes a Newsletter, edited by Mason, which includes detailed reports on political status.

"The impact of this contemporary activity is probably rather limited but the fact remains that many anthropologists, both those who were originally employed by the Navy and others who were not, remain deeply involved in solving Micronesia's political problems. Micronesia has been America's most secure anthropological preserve; there is a vested interest in keeping it that way.

"Most of this critique focuses on the early days of anthropology's involvement in consolidating power in the new American colony but much of what follows is also applicable today in so far as anthropologists continue to involve themselves in the political affairs of a colonized nation.

"POLITICAL ROLE

"Too often anthropologists have been political actors in disguise, using their status as scientists to provide a gloss of objectivity to cover their patently political involvement in matters outside the purview of scientific inquiry.

"The main thesis of this critique is that there can be no 'pure' research or objective application of policy and that in Micronesia, in particular, there has been a deep involvement in making evaluations and policy decisions. In part this has been an unavoidable response to crisis situations when thousands of people were displaced from their homes by the U. S. military. Today, Micronesian society is again in crisis as it deals with its political future in face of plans for new military bases and the beginnings of a deluge of tourists. In such situations, where important choices are being made, anthropology cannot help but be drawn into political involvement.

"There is, however, a more basic force that has led anthropologists into political action. It is in the nature of the colonial situation that citizens of the colonial power are inextricably tied to the policy of the master power. The colonial administration expects loyalty of all of its subjects and controls access to the field. The colonized treat outsiders as agents of the colonial power and force a foreigner to play that role. Only in very unusual cases can a foreigner extricate himself from ties with the colonial power. Even then, suspicions remain so long as the presence of outsiders is dependent upon the permission or toleration of the colonial administration (Memmi, 1965).

"Among anthropologists in Micronesia there has, for the most part, been no question where loyalties reside. There has been virtually no criticism of the legitimacy of the colonial system nor has there been much self-conscious appraisal of anthropology's role in Micronesia. Some social scientists (Useem, 1945; Embree, 1946) were critical of immediate post-war occupation policies but accepted for granted that Micronesia was to be permanently colonized. Many of the reports of the U. S. Commercial Company criticized Navy economic policy but the reports did not advocate a self-reliant economy. In addition, a few others like Collier (1946) were critical of the trusteeship arrangements that were railroaded through the United Nations. Never, however, was either the legitimacy of colonial rule or of anthropology's involvement questioned. In this respect, then, American anthropology played roles that were clearly in alliance with the U. S. colonial administration.

"Anthropologists have played a politi-

(GALE, continued)
cal role in another sense too. Since for various reasons the colonial administration has focused most of its energies on political subjugation rather than on economic transformation (until the mid-1960s) anthropology has been frequently charged with the task of altering political institutions--creating legislatures, introducing secret elections, changing political boundaries, and altering the power of traditional leaders. It has also played an important role in changing concepts of land tenure. Oliver, Hall, Mason and Bascom, who were employed by the war-time government run U. S. Commercial Company to develop economic plans, found that they had negligible influence in that role. (Oliver's more recent involvement in mineral development in the South Pacific shows, however, that anthropological involvement in economic imperialism can have significant impact.)

"A value-free social science is a fiction. Social scientists bring with them not only prejudices which determine the choice of subject matter, but also the means of handling it and the results obtained. Although there is little applied anthropology in Micronesia today, even those doing so-called 'pure' or 'basic' research have become somewhat more cognizant of their role than in the past. The recent ethics debates in anthropology have succeeded in making many anthropologists more conscious of their role but it has added to the frequency of the delusion that anthropologists are helping their 'subjects.' Despite this conscience-relieving self-kudo, research is virtually never done at the request of Micronesians nor are they often allowed to take part in preparing manuscripts. In fact, many anthropologists remain hesitant to allow their 'subjects' to see what has been written about them.

"It is doubtful that Micronesians themselves have found anthropology of much value to them (when they have been able to see what has been written about them). Most Micronesians simply tolerate the presence of anthropologists as another foreigner in their midst. The anthropologist wants to be a part of the community but after some months he packs his bags and leaves never to be heard from again in most cases. Gladwin's practice of paying informants is looked upon with great trepidation by most anthropologists who are both tight with their money and subject to the delusion that they are helping the people. Furthermore, since they think they are 'part of the society' such 'cash-nexus' is intolerable.

"The ethics of uninvited intervention in foreign cultures (even those within the borders of the United States) has never been considered by anthropology. Although there has been some awareness of the racist assumptions that accompany anthropological research (e.g. Caulfield, 1972), there has not yet been any serious consideration of the right to do field work. One does not become a 'good' anthropologist if one ceases to receive tainted government or corporate funds. It is not so much institutional support which should be questioned but, rather, the political context within which one operates. So long as anthropology has its 'subjects,' it remains an ally of colonialism. Anthropologists are loyal citizens first, scientists second. Whether or not they conceive of themselves in this way, their 'subjects' do. In Micronesia and anywhere else where anthropologists are of the same nationality as the colonial administration, this is of central significance, yet it is a point which is generally ignored.

"This is a problem which is aimed at contemporary anthropologists as well as those who worked for the Navy and the Interior Departments 20 years ago. The U. S. Government continues to issue permits which allow anthropologists to enter Micronesia; it is not the Micronesian people who do so.

"RACISM

"This intervention is in itself unwarranted and unethical but coupled with it, indeed the cause of it, is an assumption of the innate inferiority of Micronesians and a racism which is the bedrock of all anthropology. Not all anthropologists advocate outright assimilation but implicit in almost all the literature is the belief in the synonymity of progress and Americanization. The same dichotomy is

(GALE, continued)
always present--the Micronesian way versus the American way. Not only is the American way pictured as more sophisticated and more complex, it is also more moral since it is conceived of as more 'democratic' and 'equalitarian.' This is a very simple truth but one which is so basic to our world view that it is not often recognized.

"Mason, for example, describes the dilemma which is at the root of colonialism--teaching the people the 'right' way to live without contradicting 'democratic' precepts by imposing new standards. The problem with non-intervention, he writes, is that 'we may often find ourselves in the position of a democratic people giving support to a Micronesian feudalistic system in which inequalities abound' (1948: 4-5). In fact, however, there is no place in Micronesia, even today after 30 years of forced Americanization, where the difference between rich and poor is anywhere so great or complete as in the U. S. Because of U. S. policy the gap between various Micronesians is growing but it is the difference in economic status between Micronesians and Americans which remains the most obvious inequality. Furthermore, the communal decision-making which characterizes many local communities in Micronesia is certainly more democratic than the increasingly dictatorial rule which characterizes mass democracy in the U. S. The brutality exhibited by the U. S. against its opponents in Micronesia and in the displacement of populations should be clear enough testimony to American democracy.

"This is not a simplistic attempt to picture Micronesian society as utopian. Conflict is endemic to society and authoritarian leaders have exploited their own people. This is particularly problematic in the Marshalls where it has been exaggerated by American-created crises tied to nuclear bomb and missile testing. The point is that America certainly should not consider itself a superior culture; in doing so it has become a racist culture.

"It is the more subtle ramifications of this racism that should concern us here. Anthropology has until now dealt almost exclusively with relatively small esoteric societies to the exclusion of the anthropologist's own culture. These societies are studied wholistically and in highly generalized ways that emphasize social stasis. This anthropological conservatism also exhibits itself in romantic utopianism but the major impact of this kind of thinking is destructive since it inevitably denigrates the possibility of immanent change and denies the significance of non-ordinary behavior (may be read: revolutionary). It assumes that culture is determinate and that individual acts are unimportant to the maintenance of the scheme of things. This leads to highly fictional accounts of society as if it has perpetually existed de novo and free of exploitive influence and conflict.

"This type of thinking is not possible in a society with which one is intimately linked as an equal participant or which one thinks of as equal. It is only possible if the society is thought of as relatively simple and non-assertive. One has to be able to comprehend and 'possess' a society in the mind for it to be an anthropologically valuable area of study. The realization of this has led some contemporary anthropologists into 'domestic' poverty cultural research, but most anthropology remains firmly rooted in foreign small society research.

"Micronesia is a good case study of anthropological racism. It is interesting to note, for example, that few of the CIMA reports recognize the impact of the Spanish, German and Japanese colonial regimes nor seem particularly aware of the impact of the American invasions and the ensuing consolidation of control which was at its height while most of the CIMA investigators were in the field. In many cases, of course, CIMA investigators chose to work on more isolated islands which felt the impact of war to a lesser extent but even reports based on work in more central areas treat Micronesian society as if it had never been influenced by external forces and as if change was abnormal or non-existent. Some of the reports devote only a few lines to the colonial presence (Riesenberg, 1968; Lessa, 1966).

(GALE, continued)

"It can be argued that the CIMA research was oriented toward historical or heuristic ends and had no obligation to be politically oriented. That may be true, but as Petersen (1971) points out, there was no choice but to rely on the then existent society for clues as to how the ideal-historical system functioned. Petersen points out how in at least one case (Goodenough, 1951) this led to factual errors caused by basing traditional practices on then current realities.

"There is, however, a more basic problem hinted at by Leach (1954), which had operational significance in Micronesia. The duality Leach points out in studying gumsa and gumlao is ecologically determined but it is ultimately a distinction of the mind. This duality can also lead to the assumption that there is a pure native world uncorrupted, and, indeed, uncorruptible and a colonial society which exists in a different sphere of reality. Hughes' recent work on Ponape is a good example of this (1969).

"Part of the mythology of colonial rule, partially the work of British anthropology, is the system of indirect rule--the ludicrous belief in the ability to rule a dependent people without interfering in their lives. This was the official policy, although not the official practice, of the American Navy administration and for many years also that of the Department of Interior. It assumes that there is a traditional political system and a modern one which can be functionally differentiated with ease. Separate institutions deal with separate problems. It is a concept which accords very well with the duality of anthropology, characteristic of many of those involved in administrative affairs.

"Barnett quotes at length from the comments of the Staff Anthropologist (probably himself*) regarding indirect rule. It is an instructive example of anthropological naivety.

> I think it is quite possible for us to introduce a new political order without doing any damage to the old one, without infringing upon the powers and the authority of the existing native system. The way in which it can be done is the one indicated by Mr. H a few minutes ago; that is, by segregating the spheres of activities of the new and the old types of government. That is to say, by permitting the old system of authority to have jurisdiction over those matters which are traditional, as it always has; then restricting the authority of the new political order, whatever it is, to the solution of problems that we, by our presence, have introduced. As long as these two spheres of activity are kept segregated, there will not be any infringement of one by the other. There will not be disruption; nor need there be an attempt to make the new order take the place of the old one. There will be two parallel patterns of authority functioning in two entirely different spheres of interests. (Barnett, 1956: 138-9, emphasis added.)

"Barnett goes on to describe a case study of the relationship between traditional leaders and American appointed magistrates. Although there was conflict of role in that case with the magistrate doing menial work for the chief, a clearer conceptual understanding of the difference in role would, it was thought, end all conflict.

"There are, of course, always a plethora of cases involving the inevitable conflict between traditional society and colonial imposed institutions and demands. The naivety of the Staff Anthropologist is astounding. The actions of colonial regimes do have an impact on traditional societies, a point it would seem bears no explanation but which at least one anthropologist did not seem to recognize. Contrary assumptions are the result of naivety or the soothing ideological beliefs of the ruling class.

"In some cases this duality led to temporary strengthening of local power bases but in the long-run this emphasis has been destructive. As a result of this duality

*Barnett does not use names in most cases. A letter to him re the name of the Staff Anthropologist quoted went unanswered.

(GALE, continued)
none of the districtwide or nationwide political institutions in Micronesia contain formal roles for traditional leadership. The formal power of traditional leaders is reserved for local level affairs and even there the American created position of magistrate has led to uncertainty regarding role. A number of traditional leaders including Petrus Mailo of Truk were early members of the Congress of Micronesia but the tension between traditional legitimacy and the new authority possessed by English speaking college graduates has resulted in only one traditional leader remaining in the Congress. In comparison to most Pacific nations south of the Equator, traditional authority in national affairs is virtually nil since there are no institutional bodies or mechanisms reserving power for traditional leaders.

"This is not solely attributable to anthropologists but is in part a result of the receptivity of the colonial regime to a simplistic dualism in society. This attempt to keep traditional power at the local level has succeeded in weakening the independence movement and in severely restricting the movement toward self-government.

"Anthropologists are faulted for their conservatism--for wanting to preserve societies in face of change but, in fact, in Micronesia, at least, their inability to understand the role of colonialism has led to the destruction of the societies on which their professional careers are founded. Their inability to recognize the extent to which Micronesian societies could adapt to changing conditions by either adjusting to them or rebelling against them is generally overlooked. It is assumed that Micronesian society is unchanging while in fact the process of societal destruction has been going on in earnest for 30 years now. Unwittingly, anthropologists have contributed to this destruction. Racism need not be exhibited in displays of open antagonism, it is based on a belief that culture is determinate and basic change impossible. In this respect, despite the fondness many anthropologists have for their 'subjects,' they are basically racist if they do not accept the possibility of immanent change or the legitimacy of rebellion.

"There is a second major manifestation of anthropological racism. What has been almost essential to anthropological investigations is the dependent status of those being investigated. It is only subservient people who are subject to prying investigation just as it is only the poor in America who have to bare their entire lives to 'social workers.' Public television's series The American Family has raised many questions about privacy and the reality of observed situations but this kind of interference is a sine qua non of anthropology. Picture four young Yale anthropologists landing on Romonum in the Truk lagoon for an extended stay, each expecting a place to stay, each with his own set of questions about the most intimate part of their lives. Too little attention is paid to Simmel's work on secrecy as the basis of individuality (1955) but even lacking this much sophistication, anthropology should recognize the exploitive relationship it begins with when it enters a foreign culture, especially when the anthropologist is an employee of a conquering power. The convenient description of this kind of relationship as 'cross-cultural' is deceptive if it suggests the equality of the parties involved.

"The most telling example of this racism in Micronesia concerns the dearth of anthropological activity in the Marianas. The majority of the people in the Marianas are thoroughly intermixed with European blood, and were treated as higher class people during the Japanese period of rule, a discriminatory practice maintained under the Americans. As a result, only the kanakas--the derisive term for the darker skinned inhabitants of the Carolines and Marshalls, ever had 'district anthropologists' assigned to them and it was in these islands that almost all anthropological investigation has been done. Racism, in this case, is best exhibited in omission rather than in commission.

"COLONIAL CONTEXT

"Besides the inherent problems just discussed, it is important to study the colonial context in which anthropologists have worked and the extent to which de-

(GALE, continued)
mands and limitations placed on them by the colonial administration led to questionable acts. No doubt, most anthropologists have been more sensitive to alien ways than were their military and civilian employers but anthropologists were part of an administrative structure that was blatantly racist and which acted brutally against the Micronesian people. Drucker (1951) was convinced that no less a figure than Admiral Chester Nimitz had adopted the 'anthropological perspective' but whether or not this is so, there is ample evidence the inter-personal racism was stock in trade of the American administration, especially during the Navy days. Long before the Vietnamese became the 'gooks' the term was used for Micronesians. Documenting this institutional and personal racism is outside the scope of this critique but it is instructive to look at anthropology's involvement in one of the most tragic examples of American racism--the Bikini displacement.

"In 1946 the people of Bikini atoll were exiled from their home to make way for a long series of nuclear bomb tests. Public announcement of the tests was made in the United States weeks before the islanders themselves were told of their coming eviction. The Bikinians were given two weeks notice that, in the Navy's words, they were like the children of Israel, to be 'saved from their enemy and led into the Promised Land' (Richard, III, 510). They were gathered together after church and instructed to talk among themselves and take a vote on whether or not to leave their homes. In the meantime, the Navy was preparing to blast channels and build test facilities, and cameramen were arriving to film the historic event (which was repeated many times so that a good dramatic record could be secured).

"They were first removed to Rongerik, an uninhabitable island where for two years they lived on a starvation diet. When it became clear that they were dying and that 'native indolence' was not to blame, they were packed up again and after a couple of abortive moves, settled on Kili, an almost inaccessible island in the southern Marshalls. The ecology was amazingly different from Bikini, where subsistence was based largely on fishing. On Kili, fishing was often impossible and people had to learn for themselves how to survive in an agriculturally based economy. As a result, they suffered periodic malnutrition for many years. In 1968, the U. S. announced that it was through using the atoll and the people could begin preparations to return home. Radiation levels remain high enough that some islands are still not habitable and the top soil has had to be scraped away from the main island. In addition, the military now has new plans for using parts of Bikini for undisclosed military activities.

"Anthropologists played a role in this process of repeated displacement. Mason, Tobin, and Drucker were at various times employed by the U. S. as consultants, researchers and district anthropologists and had specific duties relating to the treatment of the Bikini people. Although they did what they could to recommend means of ameliorating the worst conditions of life in exile, the cruel inhuman manner in which the Bikinians were shunted from island to island was not openly criticized by any of the three anthropologists.

"Mason's arrival on Rongerik in 1948 coincided with a severe food shortage which led to impending starvation. He immediately alerted authorities on Kwajalein who sent food and who eventually decided to move the Bikinians to a camp on Kwajalein until it could be decided what to do with them next. Throughout this process, Mason acted as the main outside consultant to the Navy administration and as the main investigator. He had originally worked in the Marshalls as a researcher for the U. S. Commercial Company but was also at the time of the 1948 trouble a member of the Advisory Committee on Education. He has since been involved in Micronesia in a variety of other capacities. (On his role see Mason, 1948b, 1950).

"It is also worthwhile taking a brief look at Tobin's role in dealing with resettlement problems on Kili. On one visit in 1954, after a long period of isolation, Tobin visited Kili to study conditions. He did not allow any copra to be sold nor did he allow any food to be off-loaded despite the fact that the people were hun-

(GALE, continued)
gry and poor. He hoped to be able to see island life at its worst. Whether this experiment did any real harm is unclear but its propriety is certainly questionable. In fact, however, viewed in the larger context of U. S. policy toward the Bikinians it was at worst a minor indiscretion. (On his role see Tobin, 1953, 1954.)

"The Bikini situation is very complex --it involves many other factors not mentioned above. There was the problem of chiefly desuetude and the U. S. penchant for giving traditional leaders more power than they had had in the past. And there was the basic colonial contradiction-- imposing 'democracy' in a communal society.

"The major question here, however, is the ethics of anthropological involvement in the situation. Anthropologists had nothing to do with the original decision to remove the Bikinians, although they probably did have some influence over subsequent actions. In a number of instances it can be shown, as mentioned above, that anthropologists alerted authorities to problems that may have otherwise been overlooked and which could have been disastrous. Nevertheless, questions remain about anthropological responsibility. It can be argued that anthropologists did not create the Bikini situation; that they sought to help should be to their credit. But Mason and Tobin were Americans and thus do bear some responsibility for the acts of their government. This point is generally overlooked by social science but, no less than other professions, it is nationally-oriented. Social science follows the flag. What responsibility they thereby assumed is unclear, but claims to scientific isolation should not be acceptable when one's government is involved in unethical activities.

"America had been involved in Micronesia for over 100 years and from the 1850s on there had been quiet but persistent pressure from Congregationalist missionaries for annexing the islands in eastern Micronesia. The U. S. had occupied the Philippines and Guam in 1898, and had thoroughly colonized Hawaii. In such a setting, anthropology had more to consider than the mere outlines of a specific problem. The Bikini case is unforgiveable, anthropological involvement in it is no less excusable because anthropologists sought to ameliorate the worst conditions of exile. That there was no criticism of these events by anthropologists is a sign of anthropology's dependence on the American colonial administration. Science demands independence, these anthropologists were hardly independent.

"The example of anthropological involvement in the Bikini exile is not meant to be archetypal. In other situations, anthropologists were more deeply involved in policy-making and in creating an Americanized power base. In those cases the issues are much more clear-cut; it is in critical situations like the Bikini exile that standards are most lacking and in which anthropological roles become most difficult to define. Too often anthropologists have forgotten the context within which they were operating.

"THE RECORD

"The anthropological record for Micronesia is incomplete. Few of the anthropologists most intimately involved in Micronesia since the U. S. occupation began have detailed their involvement. Only the Navy's historian, Dorothy Richard, has attempted to put together an outline of the organizational arrangements through which anthropologists were employed by the Navy and the beginning of Interior Department rule.

"There were two major administrative needs which were partially fulfilled by anthropology: (1) the U. S. needed information both for planning invasions and for consolidating its rule; (2) it needed trained administrators. The two 'needs' were largely separate at first but anthropologists eventually provided information and served as administrators.

"The pages which follow deal largely with the four institutional arrangements through which the bulk of anthropologists were involved in Micronesia.

"Pre-invasion planning

"Although the U. S. has administered

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Micronesia for 30 years now, little is known about it by Americans at large. In 1941, when Pearl Harbor was attacked from Japanese bases in Micronesia, even less was known. Although American whalers and missionaries had arrived in Micronesia as early as the 1830s, under Spanish, German and Japanese regimes the islands had become almost terra incognita. Only a few Americans had been there during the Japanese times (1914-to World War II) and neither of the two who wrote about their visits saw very much.

"When the Marshalls were invaded in 1914, adequate maps had yet to be secured. Maps that had escaped dest uction by Japanese garrisons provided details for the invasion of the Marianas and Carolines. The only other major source of information was the record of the Thilenius expedition, carried out during the German administration but not published until the 1930s. Portions of it were translated at Yale by what was to become the Human Area Relations Files but it provided little up-to-date information about political organization nor about the Japanese regime. Murdock, Ford and Whiting, who began what was to become HRAF, were commissioned into the Navy and assigned to produce a series of Civil Affairs Handbooks which dealt with various Japanese industrial developments as well as with Micronesian social and political systems.

"School of Naval Administration, Stanford University

"Over 1,400 military government officers had been trained at Columbia and Princeton during the war. They were largely incipient social scientists with undergraduate degrees from leading universities who were trained by political scientists, economists and anthropologists. Only 36 of them were regular Navy, the rest were reserve officers who were quickly demobilized.

"To overcome the shortage of trained personnel, the Navy set up the School of Naval Administration under the auspices of the Hoover Institute at Stanford in 1946. The approach employed in training prospective military government officers was largely anthropological with an emphasis on role playing. The school was under the direct supervision of anthropologist Felix Keesing who noted that '. . . it is still true that only limited knowledge is available on Micronesia' (Keesing, 1948: 114; also 1949).

"SONA graduated 3 classes totaling 193 officers including some public health personnel. Almost all of the students were volunteers, most of them with college backgrounds. Two additional classes graduated from SONA after it was reactivated in 1948 and moved to the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.

"Instructors were drawn from Stanford and from among the ranks of remaining military government officers and included outside speakers. The length of the course was originally 5 months but was shortened to 3 months at Monterey. The curriculum included courses in anthropology, history, administration, comparative administration and role playing. A typical syllabus included the following courses:

- The Islands as a Setting for Administration
- The Island Populations
- History and Government
- Comparative Colonial Administration
- Military Government and Naval Administration
- International Law and Administration
- Role of the Islands in the Pacific and World Politics
- Social Conditions and Problems
- Economic Conditions and Problems
- Political Conditions and Problems
- Health Conditions and Problems
- Education and Public Opinion
- Language Learning
- Techniques of Investigation and Administration
- Seminars

"Judging the effectiveness of the SONA training is, of course, quite difficult. Richard quotes various SONA graduates who praised the program but she also quotes high-ranking Navy officers who did not like the products of Stanford any more than they did the graduates of Columbia and Princeton (1957: III, 271). Short tours of duty, frequent transfers from one district to another, lack of administrative support, supplies and transpor-

(GALE, continued)
tation, and the impending transfer of authority to the Department of the Interior severely limited the potency of the SONA graduates.

"Colonial training programs of other nations emphasized factual knowledge, language training and apprenticeship as the key to creating a competent colonial officer. The SONA graduates had a comparatively shorter training period than colonial officers of Australia, England or the Netherlands, they had no language training, and no apprenticeship. Because of the short time in the field they had difficulty in learning much about their jobs, let alone about the people they were supposed to rule.

"Whatever the shortcomings of the SONA program, though, the Department of the Interior in its 25 years of control has had no cultural or language training program at all.

"United States Commercial Company, Economic Survey of Micronesia

"The first field work in Micronesia after the occupation was conducted by anthropologists, economists, and engineers employed by the United States Commercial Company, the U. S. government's monopoly trading company in the area. Originally created and directed by Knowles Ryerson, retired dean of the School of Agriculture at the University of California, Berkeley and Davis, to feed troops, the establishment of USCC in Micronesia involved the task of setting up agricultural projects, conducting technical research of various sorts and opening trade outlets.

"The Navy made it clear at an early date that rehabilitation and maintenance of the local population was not part of its responsibility, although the Navy handled transportation of supplies. In 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that living conditions be improved at least to the point that existed under Japanese rule. Unfortunately, only emergency food was made available and construction materials which had been promised were never forthcoming. Most Micronesians built their houses out of reclaimed or 'stolen' government stocks (Richard, 1957: II, 343).

"After USCC's war-time parent bureaucracy, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, went out of business, the Navy reluctantly took over and set up the Island Trading Company. The company retained most USCC functions, but did little or no technical investigation. Locally owned businesses were urged and the Island Trading Company went out of business with an embarrassingly large profit (Richard, 1957: III, 884).

"USCC prepared a series of reports on various areas on Micronesia. Studies were made of phosphate deposits in the Western Carolines, of bauxite on Babelthuap and on livestock potential. Other reports were prepared by social scientists like Leonard Mason, who studied the socio-economic system of the Marshalls, and by John Useem who studied Yap and Palau. Douglas Oliver wrote a summary volume of recommendations and plans entitled Planning Micronesia's Future (1951 and 1971). Other than this summary report, there were only two other major summary plans published until the mid-60s: a management survey done for the Interior Department in 1950 (in which Mason participated) amd the controversial Sandelman Report in 1953.

"The USCC summary plan recommended the rehabilitation of Micronesia to 'a level of income at least equal to that existing under the Japanese prior to the war', a system which recognized native preference as paramount, and which as part of that, recognized that most Micronesians were used to imported goods. The report also recommended rapid compensation for loss of land and destruction of property and suggested that decentralization be the goal of Naval administration. It warned against the American penchant for universalizing Micronesian personality. 'Cast-off dungarees, a smattering of English, and a mission handshake are not to be regarded as evidence of thorough Americanization: it must be remembered that Micronesians--all of them--are unlike Americans in many fundamental characteristics . . .' (Oliver, 1971: 6).

"The insensitivity of the military toward traditional land values was one of

(GALE, continued)
the report's strongest criticisms. To quote Oliver:

> In a number of instances the Military Commanders show very little concern for land needs of native communities. On Peleliu, the American armed forces occupy much of the best land--more than appears justified by their number and military requirement--and have shunted the population into less desirable districts. The population is prevented from growing its staple crop, since the armed forces claim the only remaining taro lands on the island (1971: 11).

"One of the major points in the USCC report was that the Navy create goals for its administration and tell the people what these goals are. Policy floundered in ambiguity and the Micronesian people were confused and increasingly frustrated by American rule, according to Oliver.

"Unlike the work of CIMA, USCC produced the outlines of a plan, presented a whole regimen of recommendations and did so in 1946 at a time when long-range plans for ruling Micronesia had not yet been seriously considered. Because the Navy virtually ignored economic rehabilitation and because USCC from the beginning had been at odds with the Navy on almost every level of relations, few if any of the recommendations were adopted. As a result, the CIMA investigators as a whole probably had more to do with the eventual establishment of the American system than did the social scientists who worked for USCC. What a far cry from the present situation where economic 'development' has become the true fount of knowledge in Micronesia.

"Coordinated Investigation of Micronesian Anthropology

"In 1947 the Coordinated Investigation of Micronesian Anthropology was established and 35 anthropologists, 4 linguists and 3 geographers from 20 universities dispersed to all parts of Micronesia. Yale took Truk, Harvard took Yap, Wisconsin took Palau, and others took what was left. This probably remains to this day the largest anthropological expedition ever undertaken in a foreign country. Only Project Camelot would have been larger and even it would not have had so many scholars in the field in any one country. Their reports* are the most detailed ever prepared on Micronesia, and, according to Murdock who headed the anthropologist side of the project, the 'vacuum in knowledge yielded to an abundance of detailed information perhaps unparalleled for any comparable area in the world' (Richard, 1957: III, 582).

"Organized at the behest of the Navy and funded almost entirely by it, the study was coordinated by the Pacific Science Board, part of the National Research Council, which was itself part of the National Academy of Sciences. The Pacific Science Board was created especially to oversee the CIMA project. It later coordinated other research projects in Micronesia and occupied Okinawa. A small part of the funds in excess of the $100,000 appropriated by the Navy, came from the Viking Fund and from various sponsoring institutions.

"The Navy's motives in creating CIMA were vaguely defined. There are remarks in the record that sound almost like research proposals for Project Camelot. As the Navy's historian reports, 'scientists working with CIMA were asked to determine precise trends in the local development of governments and to recognize, if possible, incipient conflicts and socially disruptive patterns for correction' (Richard: III, 390). There was originally some thinking that the CIMA projects would be 'coordinated,' as the title suggests, with research projects being outlined in advance by the Navy and the Pacific Science Board. This was not to be the case, however. Neither the Navy nor the Pacific Science Board exercised any formal authority over the subject matter of research although they did have some control over where research was to be done, and, of course, they hired the researchers in the first place. Four mimeograph copies of each final report were submitted to the Pacific Science Board and then could be published at will by the CIMA investigators through commercial publishers, university presses, museums, etc. Work based on this early research continues to be

*The use of the term 'reports' is consistent with CIMA usage suggesting the idea of the applicability of research.

(GALE, continued)
published today.

"Although Murdock described CIMA as a 'model' for the 'collaboration of lay scientists and government agencies in a political democracy' (Richard: III, 582), the general instructions issued by the Navy to CIMA contain references that few anthropologists would tolerate today and which may have interfered in research. The Navy was allowed to define 'overall policy regarding publishing (including selling) of written articles of any nature, based on research done under this program.' And, most important, the Navy reserved the right to define 'matters affecting national defense or general national interests, which may not be published or written about. CIMA will accept such as an order, subject to higher review if desirable' (Richard: III, 1269).

"Much of the work produced was esoteric and of dubious operational value. Kinship studies and other abstract ethnographic material along with linguistic analyses had no conceivable political significance. Some of the work was even of dubious validity. Rorschach and TAT tests were used on Trukese, Saipanese and Palauans. Not only were the tests culturally biased, many of them, especially the tests of Saipan, were conducted at a time of major societal upheaval (Joseph and Murray, 1951; Gladwin and Sarason, 1953; Mahoney, 1951).

"Despite this the CIMA project is worthy of more than cursory examination for although described as 'pure' research, many of the CIMA projects did have applied consequences. There are a number of reasons for this. First, at least five of the CIMA researchers stayed on or later returned as administrators (Uyehara, Gladwin, Barnett, Mahoney, Riesenberg). Their influence as administrators is not easily measured but there can be no doubt that their research had applied significance.

"Second, the informal interaction among CIMA investigators, the colonial administration and Micronesians themselves may be of significance although unrecorded. The enlightenment and/or hardening of positions that can come from ced 'subjects to verbalize long unexamined or unmentionable ideas may have a direct impact on the future of the society being studied, and advice rendered to administrators by anthropologists may have had a policy impact.

"Third, in a small society like Micronesia, confidentiality and anonymity of research may be impossible. No matter how careful a researcher is in disguising facts, there is the danger of recognition, and not all researchers are careful in this regard. Vidich, for example, did a study of stability in Palau using a Parsonian schema. He described Palau as 'factionalized' and outlined the conflict between Modekngei (anti-Japanese traditionalists), Collaborators, and Radicals. Because the U. S. has reinforced the power of traditional leaders, those who benefitted most from the waning of chiefly power during Japanese times suffered, and Modekngei, a powerful opposition group, temporarily lost its raison d'etat. Vidich wrote in great detail about two 'Radicals' who had been educated in Japan and who had suffered a great loss of prestige as a result of the U. S. conquest. The specificity of his study--its use of names and occasions, left his work open to manipulative use. Anthropologists who became colonial officers did this kind of investigative work all the time, but they did not call it 'pure' research. (See Vidich, 1949.)

"The CIMA research was conducted in an environment where major societal upheaval was underway. In such situations 'pure' research is impossible. Most CIMA investigators at least implicitly recognized this since their reports often contain recommendations regarding appropriate policy, although little of it is critical nor is most of it very comprehensive. Many times the recommendations are of a pseudo-philosophical vein emphasizing the need to carefully control the process of (democratization' and to recognize the need for diverse policies for a diverse population (e.g. Murdock, 1946).

"Measuring the impact of CIMA is, of course, difficult. Many of the reports were not completed until the end of the Navy regime and were not of much use later in view of the almost complete neg-

(GALE, continued)
lect characteristic of the Interior Department style of colonial rule. Then there was the problem of translating most of the reports into language understandable to Navy and Interior policy-makers. In short, the reports themselves probably had little influence on administration. Whatever effect CIMA had was probably largely dependent upon the personality of the investigator and the circumstances.

"Even if CIMA had no impact, as some anthropologists argue, their research often reveals interesting theoretical predispositions that help explain certain simplistic racist concepts which have dominated anthropology and which probably, to some extent, characterize the attitudes of most Americans who have been involved in Micronesia.

"Most important, however, is the question with which this critique is mainly concerned--the ethics of uninvited anthropological intervention in foreign cultures. CIMA investigators as well as 'independent' researchers have a questionable right to intervene in a foreign culture. Only a colonial situation enables this kind of activity to occur. In this respect, anthropologists, even those merely doing research, strengthen colonial control and aid in the process of fostering the dependence of peoples. Whether or not a researcher receives tainted funds, his presence in a colonized society requires the sponsorship of the colonial masters.

"A successor project to CIMA, the Scientific Investigation of Micronesia, was also under the auspices of the Pacific Science Board and included a few anthropologists who had also worked for CIMA. Its emphasis was on collecting data on atoll environments and it produced a series of Coral Atoll Research Bulletins.

"Anthropologists as Administrators

"The role in which anthropology had the most impact is also the area in which the record is most incomplete. In the late 1940s, the Navy established the position of 'district anthropologist' but because of budgetary restrictions not all of these positions were filled and under the Interior Department's rule they were allowed to remain empty. Anthropologists were also employed in various other capacities as 'anthropological field consultant,' as 'internal affairs officer,' and as 'district administrator' under both the Navy and Interior Department regimes. None of these jobs was clearly defined by the U. S. administration and the anthropologists' own definition of their role varied a great deal. Barnett (1956) has provided the best account of the role played by anthropologists during the five years or so when anthropology in administration was in its prime but he makes it clear that personality and circumstance were the central determinant variables. He does make a point of emphasizing the institutionalized pressure exerted on anthropologists to do the administration's bidding and the difficulty in maintaining objectivity. In addition, he describes how few anthropologists had time to do much independent research despite the fact that their jobs were usually supposed to leave them at least 25% of their time free for that purpose.

"Therefore, it is very difficult to make generalizations about the role of anthropology in administration. This is especially the case because it was only for a few years, until the mid-50s, that anthropology played such a prominent role although Mahoney was a district administrator after this date and McKnight was employed as anthropologist into the 60s.

"The main function of anthropologists employed by the U. S. regimes was administration--implementing policies, acting as intermediaries between the administration and the people, and managing incipient conflict. Most of this was done on an informal basis and records are therefore sketchy. As Baldwin points out (1956), the anthropologist was probably the only member of the administration who spoke the local language and the only one to have lived outside the district center for any length of time. He was, therefore, usually the best intermediary and the best translator of needs and demands. This role can be painted in a number of ways, however--the anthropologist as an objective party transmitting uncolored information between the administration and the people or, at the other

(GALE, continued)
extreme, as the hatchetman of the administration. Both of these images have some validity.

"Barnett reports, for example, that one unnamed anthropologist was charged by the High Commissioner with the job of finding the Micronesians and Americans responsible for a labor strike. The anthropologist informed the suspect Micronesians that he wanted information that would help bring about an equitable settlement to the problem when, in fact, the High Commissioner was apparently intent on finding the instigators, especially the American who was the major culprit. In this case, the anthropologist acted as an informant to the government. In effect, he was a spy. (See Barnett, 1956: 158ff.)

"In most cases, however, the anthropologist's role was more mundane and much less structured by the administration although it was predominantly a one-sided activity--explaining American demands to the people and transmitting their feelings to the administration. Richard describes the 'typical duties' of the anthropological field consultant on Truk:

> ..translation and promulgation of official directives; preparation of textbooks in the native language, supervision of elections of chiefs on two islands; arranging for and acting as chairman of monthly meetings of the island chiefs of Truk lagoon; serving as a channel for native communications to civil administration; supervising the issue of licenses; fact finding on indigenous customs of land ownership (Richard, 1957: III, 362).

"In some situations there was formal activity involving the preparation of written reports (e.g. Tobin, 1953, 1954) but this was the exception rather than the rule, as Barnett points out. One of the major complaints of anthropologists was that they did not have time to do enough in-depth research.

"Another problem was the lack of communication between the Trust Territory headquarters in Hawaii and the field. There was little communication among the anthropologists themselves wither. There were periodic meetings but only the Staff Anthropologist--the territory wide anthropological administrator--was able to maintain contact with all the anthropologists in the field. One of the major themes at the periodic meetings was the clarification of roles--of the anthropologists themselves as well as of magistrates, traditional leaders and new legislative bodies. Although the administration in Honolulu had job descriptions, in practice these were of little aid and uncertainty about role was the major problem for everyone in Micronesia, white man and Micronesian alike. Much of the time it seemed that anthropologists were caught between administrative policies that had no rationale and the people, who did not know what was expected of them.

"There were crisis situations in which action was necessary. The case of the Bikini exile has already been discussed. Tobin, the district anthropologist in the Marshalls, had the job of dealing with the administration's demands regarding the exiled people and the people's need for better consideration. This situation along with the parallel situation of the Eniwetok exiles and the growth of a slum on Ebeye, meant that there were always rather immediate problems to be handled. In the other districts, this was not so often the case.

"There were instances where circumstances and the perception of the anthropologist involved deemed that more than continued adjustment to uncertainty was necessary. Gladwin was employed by the administration on Truk where he had been a CIMA investigator. He was not employed as a district anthropologist or as an anthropological field consultant (the two titles were usually interchangeable) but as 'internal affairs officer.' At the same time, Mahony and Fischer were 'anthropological field consultants.'

"Gladwin used to speak very highly of his work. Now, however, he has left anthropology but has remained very involved in Micronesia as a consultant to the Congress of Micronesia, the Truk and Palau delegations and the Independence Coalition. In an article in Applied Anthropology (1950), written at the request of the administration as a rebuttal to Hall (1950), Glad-

(GALE, continued)
win wrote about the anthropologist's obligation to 'improve [the Micronesian] way of life.' It was America's 'primary mission' and the anthropologist's major task to 'simply fill the functional gaps in their culture.' In fulfilling this duty, Gladwin sought to overcome an imbalance of power and a lack of centralized leadership by introducing secret elections skewed toward the election of a particular chief. He also changed political boundaries and tried to create 'adequate and effective' sanctions to break the power of one particular leader. These transformations in the traditional political system of the Truk lagoon are still in effect today. In 1970 while visiting Moen, the district center, Gladwin reports that a Trukese came over to talk about the Navy days and proceeded to pick out the three specific changes Gladwin imposed as the most destructive things that had happened to Truk under American rule. Gladwin now realizes that Trukese society had already begun to develop institutionalized means of handling the presence of the Americans but that none of the Americans there noticed them (1973).

"Gladwin was not the only anthropologist to act as political dictator. Unfortunately, the record remains sketchy and few anthropologists are self-conscious about the role they played in administration in Micronesia.

"CONCLUSION

"Today the engineer, the architect and the lawyer are in power in Micronesia. Since the mid-60s when it became U. S. policy to bring Micronesia into a permanent colonial status, attempts to Americanize Micronesia have been stepped up drastically. Although negotiations aimed at creating a new political status have been going on since 1969, the U.S. is insistent on maintaining a 'lasting political partnership' and has blocked further meaningful talks now that the Congress of Micronesia has voted to negotiate for independence as well as for its previously expressed preference for 'free association.'

"As part of American plans, as outlined in the Solomon Report (1963), economic 'development' and an Americanized educational system were to be pushed. Nathan Associates produced an economic plan (1965), Stanford Research Institute did an educational plan (1967) and Hawaii Architects and Engineers has prepared a master physical plan (1968). As already mentioned (p. 4), anthropologists participated in the drafting of the SRI report and as consultants to Hawaii Architects and Engineers. Most of the participants were non-anthropologists, however.

"Plans for new military bases underlies much of the increased U.S. interest in Micronesia. There are reports that in 1965 Murdock was approached by the Air Force about doing a follow-up study based on CIMA. The timing was unfortunately coincident with the exposure of Project Camelot and the idea was apparently dropped. Moos has been doing research on rapid change in Micronesia under the sponsorship of the Deparyment of Defense. He has employed graduate students and Micronesians to do research for him. To date nothing has been published. Moos is presently in residence at the Naval War College.

"The overall impact of anthropology on U.S. policy or on Micronesians themselves is probably very small today. Nevertheless, many of the criticism made against anthropology in its prime are still applicable today, especially among those anthropologists who have been working for action-oriented government agencies.

"Micronesia is a case study of anthropology at its worst. Happily, the worst activities of anthropology are a thing of the past. Yet anthropology has still not met the basic problem head-on; it continues to act without clearly defined guidelines and ethics. At a time when Micronesian society is being rapidly transformed into a permanently subservient state, anthropologists have an obligation to reconsider their past and present involvement. This critique does not conclude with guidelines nor with easy conclusions but it is hoped that anthropology will begin to examine its basic premises and seek to overcome its alliance with colonialism.

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IN REBUTTAL

THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL PRESENCE IN AMERICAN MICRONESIA

by

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"In his critique of the case of applied anthropology in the United States Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Micronesia), Roger Gale has pointed to a number of central issues meriting further examination by this symposium. It so happens that my own views are in basic agreement with his as to the importance and urgency of reviewing the issues toward the creation of more explicit guidelines for anthropological endeavor in the contemporary world. I do not always agree with his evaluation of what anthropologists have or have not contributed, but our differences encourage further dialogue toward a better understanding on both sides of what applied anthropology is all about (or should be) today. His criticism, as a doctoral candidate in Political Science, is on the one hand unhampered by the shibboleths usually honored in Anthropology, but betrays otherwise his lack of knowledge and experience about how anthropologists generally operate in field situations. In what follows, I will limit my discussion to Anthropology itself

(MASON, continued)
though it will be obvious that many implications exist for Social Science as a whole.

"CENTRAL ISSUES

"Five central issues are identified here for further exploration, not only as they apply to anthropology in Micronesia but also as they relate to anthropological activities in other parts of the world.

"(1) The ethics of anthropological investigation and/or intervention in a foreign (or colonial) society need clarification especially as to the investigator's sponsorship and the right of access to conduct field research or other related activity.

"(2) The time-honored distinction between pure and applied research has become meaningless, owing to the practically unavoidable involvement of anthropological practitioners in modern political contexts.

"(3) The role of the American anthropologist in an American-administered territory (e.g. the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands) is complicated by his simultaneous role as an American citizen, and raises the question of what action is appropriate when his research findings provide him with a basis for criticizing his government.

"(4) Problems of confidentiality and anonymity of information sources have increased as 'subjects' of anthropological research and investigation become more literate and prepared to review the published results of the anthropologist's field research, and as the same 'subjects' move into political offices that control the right of access to investigative sites.

"(5) An increase in opportunities for technical anthropological training and collaborative participation of 'subject' peoples in field research projects would appear to be an essential condition for the continuation of anthropological investigation by foreigners.

"RACISM IN AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGY

"Before continuing my presentation I wish to respond briefly concerning one other issue which Gale has interjected in his critique. I must reject categorically Gale's charge that American anthropologists assume the 'innate inferiority of Micronesians,' and that while 'not all anthropologists advocate outright assimilation' there is implicit in their works the 'belief in the synonymity of progress and Americanization' (p. 5). Likewise, I must challenge his statement that 'anthropological conservatism . . . exhibits itself in romantic utopianism' and 'denigrates the possibility of immanent change' (p. 6). Further, he reveals his own ignorance of developments in contemporary anthropology when he charges the discipline with assuming 'that culture is determinate and that individual acts are unimportant to the maintenance of the scheme of things' and with denying 'the significance of non-ordinary behavior (may be read: revolutionary)' (p. 6). In attributing such prejudices to the discipline, he conceives 'a racism which is the bedrock of all anthropology' (p. 5). I can only regard such statements as reflecting Gale's own emotional bias and indicating the pitfalls awaiting the critic who wanders carelessly outside his own specialty. A more careful reading on his part of the anthropological literature, even that restricted to Micronesian studies, should have demonstrated to him the naivete of his remarks on this topic.

"THE MAIN THRUST OF GALE'S CRITIQUE

"Gale cites Micronesia as 'a case study of anthropology at its worst' (p. 17). Let's see just what he means by this. He begins by asserting that 'virtually all anthropological activity' in Micronesia has been directed at the question of 'what to do about the natives'--a problem-oriented perspective that has become a 'hallmark of anthropology' in the Trust Territory (p. 2). In meeting that commitment, he assures us, anthropologists have been concerned with 'purposively oriented knowledge aimed at the maintenance of a stable society, the introduction of norms deemed valuable by the U. S. colonial administration and especially social and political

(MASON, continued)
institutions whose purpose has been to make Micronesians dependent on continuing U. S. largesse and authority' (p. 2). Toward that end, he charges, they 'have acted to implement decisions of the U. S. military and civilian regimes,' they have served 'as hired spies gaining anthropological confidences for political purposes,' and in certain cases they have operated as 'virtual political dictators' (p. 2). He goes on to claim that even those field workers who are 'merely doing research' have helped to 'strengthen colonial control' and have contributed to 'the process of fostering the dependence of peoples' in Micronesia upon the United States government (p. 15). He then concludes by hoping 'that anthropology will begin to examine its basic premises and seek to overcome its alliance with colonialism' (p. 17). This is a very serious indictment of anthropology in Micronesia, if indeed it is true.

"AMBIVALENCE IN GALE'S CRITIQUE

"The sting of Gale's attack diminishes when one reads his paper with more attention to the many contradictions it contains. I suggest that Gale has tried to construct a straw man to challenge but in providing supportive testimony he has done his homework with more emotion than care. Throughout his argument one reads statements which suggest quite another image of anthropology in Micronesia.

"For example, with reference to the USCC Economic Survey in 1946 in which several anthropologists took part, Gale reports a major recommendation to rehabilitate Micronesia at least to income levels prevailing prior to the war when Japan controlled the islands. The survey thereby, he concurs, 'recognized native preference as paramount' and observed that 'most Micronesians were used to imported goods.' Gale also appears to award good marks for the team's criticism of the Navy for its 'insensitivity toward traditional land values' and for failing 'to create goals for its administration and tell the people what these goals are.' Even though the USCC Survey produced outlines of a long-range plan for Micronesia's economic future, Gale admits that 'few if any of the recommendations were adopted' (pp. 12-13).

"Although he is unquestionably opposed to colonialist practices, Gale in another place cites colonial training programs of other nations as emphasizing 'factual knowledge, language training and apprenticeship as the key to creating a competent colonial officer.' He then proceeds to fault the SONA program directed by Keesing at Stanford for having provided 'no language training, and no apprenticeship,' and a comparatively shorter training period. 'Whatever the shortcomings of the SONA program,' he adds, 'the Department of the Interior in its 25 years of control has had no cultural or language training program at all' (p. 12). (In point of fact, the Trust Territory administration in 1966 instituted a series of annual workshops to prepare new contract teachers from the United States in useful language and cultural skills, taught by anthropologists and linguists.)

"Of the CIMA program in 1947, described by Gale as 'the largest anthropological expedition ever undertaken in a foreign country' (p. 13), he concludes that it produced 'a great deal of esoteric research . . . which was of little or no administrative or operative value' (p. 2). Even though CIMA was funded largely by the Navy, Gale acknowledges that the 'basic research activities' (p. 2) reported by CIMA participants 'probably had little influence on administration' and that 'whatever effect CIMA had was probably largely dependent upon the personality of the investigator and the circumstances' (p. 15).

"As regards the anthropologists later employed by Navy and Interior administrations as advisers on Micronesian affairs at the district level, a role in which 'anthropology had the most impact' (p. 15), Gale reports that they 'have been more sensitive to alien ways than were their military and civilian employers' (p. 9), and were often 'the only member of the administration who spoke the local language and the only one to have lived outside the district center for any length of time' and was, 'therefore, usually the best intermediary and the best translator of needs and demands'

(MASON, continued)
(p. 15).

"'Anthropologists are faulted for their conservatism,' says Gale, 'for wanting to preserve societies in face of change' (p. 8). On the other hand, he sees a current concern of anthropologists 'for the solution of political problems' in Micronesia as a 'major enterprise' (p. 2), although he adds practically in the same breath that 'the impact of this contemporary activity is probably rather limited' (p. 4). He makes a point of the fact that today the engineer, lawyer, and architect have largely superceded the anthropologist in American government attempts to 'Americanize Micronesia' which have been 'stepped up drastically . . . since the mid-1960s' (p. 17). He concludes here that 'the over-all impact of anthropology on U. S. policy or on Micronesians themselves is probably very small today' (p. 17). One wonders then precisely what roles have been played by anthropologists in Micronesia over the past thirty years--certainly not the 'handmaiden' of the United States government (p. 2) assisting in the 'consolidating [of] power in the new American colony' (p. 4), and certainly not the ivory-tower social scientist who remains completely aloof from personal involvement in the changing lives of Micronesians.

"Admittedly the record is sadly incomplete, as Gale frequently points out. Perhaps the principal thing for us to remember in evaluating the impact of anthropology in Micronesia is that more than 70 or 80 anthropologists have conducted research in Micronesia since 1946, and that anthropologists are above all individualists, human beings each with his own set of values, and only incidentally anthropologists. Individually, they have represented over the years almost every conceivable position on a continuum from one extreme of personal involvement to the other. Gale has cited a number of specific examples, most of them chosen from the extremes of this spectrum to illustrate his arguments. Most anthropological activity in Micronesia, as related to the United States administrative effort, has remained anonymous and lies, not surprisingly, in the middle range. Few anthropologists have self-consciously viewed their roles in Micronesia in their published works (Barnett is the principal exception in his Anthropology in Administration, Row, Peterson, 1956). It is possibly for this reason that Gale has found it necessary to generalize from the more conspicuous cases, assuming them to be common practice when they are not. I can say from my own knowledge that the anthropologist's role in relation to the administration in the Trust Territory has been constantly reviewed in informal conversations among anthropologists who have worked and are now working in Micronesia whether their research has been 'pure' or had 'applied' associations.

"Gale appears to have ignored the ambivalence reflected in his critique and resorted to a tactic of 'guilt by association.' Regardless of their actual performance in Micronesia, Gale applies the tarbrush to anthropologists either because they worked for the administration or more simply because they were Americans conducting research in an American-controlled territory.

"NEW LIGHT ON THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL RECORD

"In recent years it has become popular to be anti-government in principle, and on that basis many Americans have adopted openly critical positions on a variety of issues. Much of this opposition, of course, has emerged from the popular reaction to an unpopular war in Southeast Asia. In World War II the climate of opinion about association with the federal government was entirely different and for understandable reasons. Social science and the United States government worked closely together in the common defense effort against Germany and Japan, and very few ever questioned the appropriateness of that relationship. American anthropologists freely offered their services during the national crisis, applying their technical skills and knowledge within countless government agencies both civilian and military in the European-African and Pacific-Asian theaters of war. In the course of that service, they became experienced in the give-and-take maneuvering common to the operation of any federal agency even in time of war. While most of the anthro-

(MASON, continued)
pologists left government employment at the close of the war, returning to preferred positions in academia, many were to utilize their government experience in later maneuvering with government bureaucracy as in the case of Micronesia. It is important to know this background in evaluating anthropology's relationship to the federal government in Micronesian affairs in the 1940's and early 1950's, when so-called applied anthropology in that area was at its height as Gale quite correctly points out. To be employed by or associated with the federal government does not necessarily mean an uncritical acceptance of or compliance with announced agency policy. As we all know from experience, policies are determined as much in lower level implementation as they are in higher level formulation.

"Yale Cross-Cultural Survey

"Immediately following Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the entire facilities of Yale University's Cross-Cultural Survey (reorganized in 1949 as the Human Relations Area Files) were re-directed toward the collection and analysis of all available information on the Japanese mandated islands with a view to aiding the war effort at such time as American military forces would occupy the enemy-held territory. The resulting collection of data was compiled from various published materials going back as far as the German administration in the 1880's. It was made available not only to the U. S. military for intelligence purposes but also to private individuals for academic research, through file copies maintained at Yale University and at the Ethnogeographic Board in the Smithsonian Institution in Washington. In 1943, Survey director G.P. Murdock and his two associates C. S. Ford and J. W. M. Whiting accepted Navy commissions and, as part of Naval Intelligence, produced a series of Vicil Affairs Handbooks on major regions of the Micronesian territory. While these handbooks were classified "restricted" they were not difficult for private individuals to obtain. They were completely available after the war when, for a time, they constituted the only comprehensive publication of cultural data on the peoples of Micronesia. They were used as manuals by Military Government personnel following the American occupation of the mandated islands in 1944-1945.

"USCC Economic Survey of Micronesia

"Several months after the close of the war in the Pacific, the Navy's military government section contracted with the U. S. Commercial Company to undertake a comprehensive survey of Micronesia's natural and human resources as the basis for short-term economic rehabilitation and long-term planning. USCC was a subsidiary of the Foreign Economic Administration which during the war years had been concerned with the utilization of natural resources in other parts of the Pacific. Douglas L. Oliver, Harvard anthropologist and USCC administrator, was mainly responsible for initiating the survey and directed it from his office in Honolulu. Of some 25 scientists who were recruited from other agencies and academic institutions to participate in the survey, most were specialists in biology and geology. The human resources, however, were studied by social scientists assigned to major regions of the territory. These included anthropologists John Useem, Edward T. Hall, William Bascom, and myself, geographer Karl J. Pelzer, and economist Edward E. Gallahue. Separate reports were filed by all survey participants, based on their investigations carried out in the field from April to August, 1946. An editorial board of social and natural scientists put together a summary report under Oliver's editorship, which contained specific recommendations and an outline of a plan for improving the Micronesian economy. Plans for Navy publication of the survey reports did not materialize, owing mainly to the fact that much of the reporting was critical of the Navy's lack of attention to the islands' economic recovery to date. However, all reports were microfilmed by the Library of Congress and have been available there for use by any researcher. Through Oliver's personal efforts after returning to Harvard, the summary report was published in 1951 by Harvard University Press under the title Planning Micronesia's Future (re-issued in 1971 by the University of Hawaii Press). The Navy never did exercise any censorship of either the summary or the individual reports.

(MASON, continued)
Only few of the recommendations were acted upon, as Gale has noted in his critique. The survey, while organized primarily to develop solutions to practical economic problems faced by the Micronesians, was the first intensive research undertaken by American anthropologists in Micronesia and as such represented an important increment to our knowledge of this island area.

"Stanford School of Naval Administration

"Between April, 1946, and August, 1947, Military Government Officers for the first time received intensive training before moving to assignments in American-occupied Micronesia, when the Navy contracted with the Hoover Institute at Stanford University to set up the School of Naval Administration. Felix M. Keesing, assistant director of SONA, combined his extensive background of anthropological research in the Pacific and techniques developed during the war in training military personnel in Stanford's Far Eastern Area and Language Program. Role-playing was applied to specific problems of island administration as described by Navy officers who were seconded to SONA from different districts in Micronesia where they had first-hand experience during the initial occupation phase. A principal goal of the program was to develop culturally sensitive attitudes among officer trainees in discharging their island administration duties. Materials utilized in the course included copious references to reports from the USCC Survey as well as the older Civil Affairs Handbooks. These were put together under Keesing's direction and published by the Navy in 1948 as the Handbook on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. For the next few years this handbook, readily available to the general public from the U. S. Government Printing Office, constituted the principal reference work on Micronesia. The fruits of SONA training in the subsequent performance of Navy administrators in Micronesia varied with the individual, as might be expected. In general, from my own observations of the Navy administration from 1946 to 1951, the results were positive as evidenced by the greater willingness of SONA-trained officials to consider Micronesian felt needs.

"Coordinated Investigation of Micronesian Anthropology

"The Pacific Science Board (PSB) was established by the National Research Council in 1946, following a Washington conference of natural and social scientists which aimed at extending American scientific investigations in the Pacific, furthering international cooperation, and advising governmental and other agencies on scientific matters. Activities of the Board, whose executive secretary was biologist Harold J. Coolidge, were financed mainly by grants from the Office of Naval Research (ONR). At a time when the National Science Foundation had not yet incorporated funding of social science research within its jurisdiction, ONR was the principal source of grant support for basic research. The Board initiated four major programs, all concerned with Micronesia. The first was the Coordinated Investigation of Micronesian Anthropology (CIMA), launched in June, 1947. Later programs were Scientific Investigation in Micronesia (SIM), oriented toward ecological research; the Invertebrate Consultants Committee for Micronesia (ICCM), for solutions to agricultural pest probelms; and the Committee for Conservation in Micronesia (CCM).

"CIMA was a massive ethnographic salvage program concerned with island cultures known to American anthropologists only through the limited works of earlier German and Japanese investigators. CIMA filled in blank Micronesian areas on the cultural map of Oceania by observations of still viable traditional practices and by reconstruction from data obtained from oldest still living informants. It is quite true, as Gale emphasizes unnecessarily in his paper, that CIMA anthropologists generally chose not to report on the considerable culture change going on at the time. Their intentionally primary interest in baseline studies of traditional cultures were to provide the necessary background for subsequent anthropological researches which have been more problem-oriented and have achieved much greater analytical depth and insight into contemporary social, economic, and political changes in Micronesia. This later research

(MASON, continued)
is being done by former CIMA researchers who have returned to Micronesia and by a younger generation of graduate students encouraged and directed by professors who as CIMA participants had not necessarily continued their own activities in Micronesia.

"While the Navy did fund CIMA, it did not require action-oriented inquiry and it placed no restriction in fact on publication of the results. George P. Murdock of Yale University directed the CIMA program, but his initial attempts at coordinating the work of 42 anthropologists, linguists, and geographers from 23 American universities and museums were thwarted by the individualism which subsequently emerged in project implementation. Funding took the form of research grants from the Pacific Science Board. Most applications were for individually conducted research, although a few of the universities proposed team projects. Tremendous variation existed in project conception, prior anthropological experience brought to the task, methodology employed, and length of time in the field (4 to 6 months on the average). Site selection was determined largely by the project worker; all principal island groups in Micronesia were included. The terms of funding required that so-called "final reports" be submitted if publication in the near future was not anticipated. Most unpublished research reports were reproduced inexpensively and distributed to some 50 libraries in the United States. CIMA provided advice and information for direct use to Navy civil administration units only on an informal basis and on the initiative of the individual CIMA participant.

"No appreciable difference can be noted in the activity of researchers in the field or in the reporting of their research findings, as between those who participated in CIMA with Pacific Science Board funding and those who came later with grants from the National Science Foundation or the National Institute of Mental Health. In practically all cases, earlier and later, federal funds were involved, with 'no strings attached,' and investigators reflected considerable differences in training, interest orientation, bias about application of research findings, relationships with Micronesian informants, and arrangements for publication.

"Anthropologists in Administration

"After the CIMA program, as Gale has pointed out, Navy administration recruited a few CIMA participants as anthropological aides at the district level--Thomas Gladwin, Francis Mahoney, and Harry Uyehara. By 1951, under Interior, every district staff included an anthropologist and in the decade thereafter several others had been recruited as replacements. All of these were hired directly from Hawaii or U. S. mainland graduate schools and had had no association with CIMA; these included Jack Tobin, John L. Fischer, Shigeru Kaneshiro, Frank Mahony, Robert R. Solenberger, Richard Emerick, and Robert McKnight. Homer Barnett has provided a full description of the earlier activities, responsibilities, and problems associated with these jobs in his Anthropology in Administration (Row, Peterson, 1956). As he explains there, the assignments turned out to be mainly administrative, a frustration to the anthropologists who when hired had seen their primary work as field research, either basic ethnography or analysis of special situations. Some district anthropologists had more leeway in this regard, others were restricted to office work which seemed to have but little anthropological relevance. The individual situation varied a great deal depending on the relationship existing between the anthropologist and his immediate supervisor, the District Administrator. The latter was not an anthropologist, of course, although several had graduated from the Navy SONA program and had stayed on in Interior administration after leaving the Navy. A few district anthropologists, like Tobin, managed to have their research work reproduced for unclassified distribution, but others too often saw their research analyses buried in district fiels whether action had been taken on them or not. In most districts, selected Micronesians (without any formal training) were assigned as assistant anthropologists to work closely with the American aides. Between 1957 and 1961, the Staff Anthro-

(MASON, continued)
pologist edited a series of 9 studies on land tenure, agricultural practices, economic institutions, and naming, authored by the district anthropologists and their Micronesian assistants and published by the Trust Territory for general distribution under the title Anthropological Working Papers.

"The post of Staff Anthropologist, established by the Navy at the headquarters level, was continued after 1951 by Interior Department. Its orientation was definitely anthropological at first, but later incumbents gave it an increasingly administrative and non-anthropological flavor. The Navy post was occupied by Lcdr. Philip Drucker. After Interior took over, Homer Barnett, Saul Riesenberg, and Allan Smith succeeded each other at one or two year intervals until 1955 (both Barnett and Riesenberg had earlier worked in Micronesia with CIMA). In 1955 John deYoung became Staff Anthropologist and in 1961 his title was changed to Program Officer to conform with the changing character of the position. When deYoung left the Trust Territory in 1966 he was Assistant Commissioner for Public Affairs.

"By 1961 the tradition of District and Staff Anthropologists had pretty well disappeared from the scene, partly for budgetary reasons, partly because district administrators (many with service going back to Navy Military Government) felt they no longer required the investigative assistance of anthropologists, especially less knowledgeable new recruits. As incumbents in the district anthropologist slots left to return to graduate school or to take posts in academic institutions in the United States, no replacements were hired. Where a few anthropologists (Francis Mahoney, Robert McKnight, and Jack Tobin) did continue in administration after 1961 they were absorbed in education and community development programs.

"Bikini Marshallese Resettlement

"Roger Gale in his discussion of the Bikinian displacement acknowledges that 'the Bikini situation is very complex--it involves many other factors not mentioned here((p. 10). This is certainly true. Some of those 'other factors' are essential to this discussion. Though Bikinians were removed from their home atoll to Rongerik Atoll in March, 1946, it was nearly two years before any anthropologist became involved in the resettlement process. Following rumors of extreme hardship suffered by the people on Rongerik, a public attack was made by Interior Secretary Harold Ickes on the Navy's handling of the matter. In January, 1948, I managed to be assigned by the High Commissioner to undertake an outside evaluation of the Bikinians' plight. My recommendations were based on extensive observation and interviews with the people themselves at Rongerik. Prompt action by Navy officials relieved the immediate threat to the community when it was removed to a temporary encampment on Kwajalein. On my return to Honolulu from Rongerik I reported the critical nature of the situation to newsmen. A lengthy written report was submitted to the High Commissioner as requested, with my suggestions for future handling of the resettlement, as the people could not be returned to Bikini. I had no further official connection with the resettlement. Later I expanded my report to place the facts in the public record ('The Bikinians: A Transplanted Population,' Human Organization, 9:5-15, Spring 1950). John Collier, then head of the Institute of Ethnic Affairs, a private organization working on behalf of minority and dependent peoples, asked for and received my permission to distribute reprints of that article to all members of the U. S. Congress and to others who might be interested.

"The Bikinians themselves by secret vote on Kwajalein decided to move to Kili Island, having apparently been swayed more by the advantages of the site than by its disadvantages which they were well aware of. When difficulties later arose in adjusting to Kili, the situation was investigated in depth by staff anthropologist Philip Drucker on a priority assignment from the High Commissioner in April and May, 1950. Drucker's detailed report, which contained practical recommendations for remedying the situation, was never published although it was not classified and copies were available outside the Navy. His long-term recommendations were not

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carried through, because the Navy administration was replaced the following year by Interior. I did my doctoral dissertation on the resettlement through 1950 (Relocation of the Bikini Marshallese: A Study in Group Migration, Yale University, 1954). While this was not published, it has been readily accessible on microfilm, and I have published a number of articles and read professional papers based on that and subsequent researches I have done.

"Jack Tobin, district anthropologist for the Marshalls and more recently community development adviser, has been under continuing orders to monitor the Kili situation. In 1953 the Kili Development Project was launched by the Trust Territory government to improve economic conditions on the island. The two project leaders, both Micronesians, were given special training for the assignment under my direction at the University of Hawaii. James Milne started the project in 1953, and was succeeded a few years later by Konto Sandbergen. Tobin visited Kili several times and wrote lengthy reports on two of those visits with his evaluation of activities and recommendations for further improvement. These reports have been available outside government circles.

"I conducted research on Kili Island in 1957 with a grant from the Tri-Institutional Pacific Program (Carnegie Corporation funds) and again in 1963 when I worked with Robert Kiste as part of Barnett's comparative research Study of Displaced Communities in the Pacific, financed by a continuing grant from the National Science Foundation to the University of Oregon. Kiste's doctoral dissertation on changing patterns of land tenure and social organization of the ex-Bikini Marshallese was filed at the University of Oregon in 1968. A separately written research study for Barnett's program was also completed in 1968, and has been published by the University's Anthropology Department, entitled Kili Island: Study of the Relocation of the ex-Bikini Marshallese. None of these projects was in any way associated with the Trust Territory government, although verbal reports of research findings were offered to the District Administration before we left the field. In both instances, our findings were largely ignored by the administrator. Tobin has continued to bear responsibility for monitoring the return of the people to their home atoll, a project now in process. Kiste's research will appear shortly in abbreviated form in the Kiste and Ogan Social Change Series in Anthropology (Cummings Publishing Co.) under the title of The Bikinians: A Study in Forced Migration.

"Gale's charge against the U. S. government that 'the Bikini case is unforgiveable' (p. 10) is quite true. However, he is in error when he adds that 'there was no criticism of these events by anthropologists.' As outlined above, both criticism and recommendations for alternative solutions in the years after the 1946 removal removal from Bikini have been voiced by the anthropologists involved, within government circles as well as to the American public at large. Only by their reporting have the details of the displacement from 1946 to the present become part of the public record.

"THE PAST DECADE OF ANTHROPOLOGY IN MICRONESIA

"Two phases of American anthropology in the Trust Territory may be identified, with the dividing line about 1960 or 1961. The earlier phase, treated in the foregoing discussion, recalls such 'old-timers' as Barnett, Burrows, Gladwin, Goodenough, Emory, LeBar, Lessa, Riesenberg, Schneider, and Spiro, all of whom took part in CIMA and continued for several years to publish on data obtained then. Others like Fischer, Mahony, McKnight, and Tobin (Gladwin, Barnett, and Riesenberg are in this group also) were employed by the Trust Territory administration and drew on that experience in their writing. Still others (Spoehr and myself) worked out of their own institutions. Of this older group only a few have continued to be active in Micronesian anthropology, namely Fischer, Gladwin, Goodenough, Lessa, Mahony, McKnight, Riesenberg, Tobin, and myself.

"Many younger people have appeared on the scene in the second phase, about half of whom are students of the earlier workers. Names like Alkire, Carroll, Force, Hainline, Hughes, Kiste, Lieber,

(MASON, continued)
Lingenfelter, Marshall, Nason, Osborne, and Wilson come readily to mind, and the students of some of these are beginning to form a third generation. The later anthropologists tend to be more problem-oriented, less exclusively ethnographic, more given to studies of social and political change, still concerned with outer island peoples in contrast to the district centers, apparently more committed to returning to Micronesia for follow-up research than was the case earlier, and financed primarily by individual grants from the National Science Foundation and the National Institute of Mental Health.

"After USCC, CIMA, and Trust Territory employment, a kind of slump in anthropological activity developed in Micronesia during the latter 1950's. In my opinion, this happened for several reasons. The earlier investment in field research required time to catch up in publication. The flush of discovery in a fairly virgin territory had passed, and other areas of the world, such as Africa and Melanesia, and new theoretical interests diverted some researchers away from further fieldwork in Micronesia. Then, too, the change in attitude toward anthropology in government which accompanied the Republican replacement of Democratic control in the nation's capitol depressed the utilization of anthropologists in Micronesia as elsewhere in the federal government. The earlier and later phases were bridged briefly by researchers in the Tri-Institutional Pacific Program (Bishop Museum, University of Hawaii, and Yale University with a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York) and the Study of Displaced Communities in the Pacific (University of Oregon, with a grant from the National Science Foundation), but these had only indirect application to problems of island administration. Both programs defined their working ground as the entire Pacific, and more of the research was undertaken in Polynesia and Melanesia than in Micronesia. However, the linguistic work of Dyen and Grace, supported by TRIPP, provided a useful baseline for newly developing interests in Micronesian linguistics, spurred on by an applied emphasis in Peace Corps language training and development of orthographies for use in bilingual education in Trust Territory schools.

"During the 1950's American anthropology itself was undergoing a massive re-evaluation (cf. Anthropology Today, edited by A. L. Kroeber, Chicago, 1953), which led to new priorities in theory and methodology in studying culture change and acculturation. Graduate schools and funding agencies placed new emphasis on problem-oriented research, e.g. in social anthropology, though not necessarily the problems of contemporary peoples, as in Micronesia. However, much of this new look had important implications for problem-solving in Micronesian affairs, e.g. the several symposia on political development in Micronesia conducted in the 1970's. The character of American society itself was changing, as was also that of Micronesian society. The trends of the times could not help but influence the research interests of the younger generation of anthropologists, and their involvement in Micronesian political affairs, as Gale reminds us (p. 4).

"This is not to say that social and cultural change in Micronesia got underway only after the United States assumed control of the islands as World War II ended. Roger Gale implies the latter when he charges anthropologists with having 'assumed that Micronesian society is unchanging while in fact the process of societal destruction has been going on in earnest for 30 years now' (p. 8). In fact, drastic changes had already occurred in the Marianas as early as the 17th century and began in parts of the Marshalls and the Carolines during the mid-19th century when the unsettling activities of whalers, traders, and missionaries were aggravated by the actions of German and Japanese administrators. After World War II, the Micronesians themselves clamored for a return at least to the economic levels established under the Japanese. Ever since then, Micronesians within the administration and in the Congress of Micronesia have voiced a similar theme in the face of miserly financing by the U. S. government until 1963. Similar wants have been voiced by islanders as they have crowded unceasingly into the more urbanized district centers and created new problems of living both for

(MASON, continued)
themselves and for the administration. (Elsewhere, I have repeatedly maintained that anthropologists might give their attention to studying the changing scene in the district centers, when they have persisted in putting their research effort into investigating change in the outer islands where the urge toward modernization has been less in evidence.)

"Renewed Emphasis on Fieldwork in Micronesia

"It is probably true that Micronesia is more attractive to anthropological field researchers today in terms of the costs if not also in terms of access, compared to other world areas more distant from the United States and controlled by non-American administrations. However, I believe that the islands have greater drawing power now because of the considerable backlog of reasonably good ethnographies obtained in the earlier phase, and also due to stimulation and encouragement of graduate students by professors who took part in the earlier work, whether the latter have continued to be active in Micronesian anthropology or not. Another factor is the significant number of ex-Peace Corps Volunteers who served in Micronesia and have now entered graduate anthropology and returned to Micronesia for their field research. Micronesia, also in the past decade, has received more attention from the American press, owing to the newsworthiness of Micronesian negotiations with the U. S. government for increased autonomy or independence in controlling their own destiny. This may, indeed, be the principal explanation for an increasing interest in recent anthropological research on the subject of political change in Micronesia. The changing educational scene has been investigated mainly by educators or by the few anthropologists with a background in education. Changes in the economic area have been examined for the most part (except in land tenure studies by anthropologists) by economists engaged in administrative planning for long-range development of the Micronesian economy. The latter activity has been focused on the district centers to the near exclusion of the outer islands. As noted above, anthropologists have concentrated their research in the outer islands, and the necessary dialogue between economists and anthropologists has failed to take place.

"The Changing Role Relationship between Anthropologist and Administrator

"Another kind of change in Micronesia within the last decade is destined to present a major challenge to American anthropologists who undertake field research in the islands. This has to do with the increasing number of Micronesians who now occupy administrative posts once held by American expatriates. In the late 1940's and the 1950's all Trust Territory positions vested with any degree of authority were occupied by American appointees. Whenever anthropologists either in the government or outside pressed for improvement in the Micronesians' situation, they had perforce to influence decisions made by officials who were, like themselves, members of the same American society. For the most part, such maneuvering was done in the field on an interpersonal basis, because the American public has never been, then or now, sufficiently interested to lobby for Micronesian needs at the national policy-making level. Anthropologists have achieved varying success in these attempts to modify American administrative decisions in the field depending on their resourcefulness as individuals and their understanding of how the U. S. government bureaucracy operates, i.e. where and by whom the important decisions are made. Today, even though major policy continues to be determined by American bureaucrats in Washington and at headquarters on Saipan, the day-to-day interpretation and implementation of that policy is increasingly controlled, or at least significantly influenced, by the Micronesians in the Trust Territory administration and those in the Congress of Micronesia, the district legislatures, and the more active of municipal councils.

"Although anthropologists from the United States have now devoted 30 years to the study of Micronesian cultures, they have never claimed that this gave them the ability to become a 'part of the society' as Gale has charged them with (p. 5). Yet because they did understand

(MASON, continued)
more of Micronesian behavior than most American administrators did, they were able to joust with the latter more or less effectively in the give-and-take of a game played by the rules of American society to which they all belonged. Now, however, a new situation is developing in which anthropologists are finding themselves in the position of offering advice about Micronesian culture and society to Micronesians holding executive and legislative offices. Quite understandably Micronesians may resent such actions (and already some have done so) on the grounds that being Micronesians they know themselves well enough without counsel from outsiders. Although such an attitude seems most reasonable on the face of it, I have observed in the past two or three years that islanders in high office are frequently no longer in close touch with the condition of people in their own jurisdictions, particularly where those people live outside the district centers. The home contacts of many of the officeholders were interrupted during the many years the latter were away at school (often through the college years) and later employed or holding public office in the district center or at headquarters on Saipan. As a consequence, they have tended to develop more westernized than Micronesian orientations in fundamental cultural values. Furthermore, few islanders appear to be very knowledgeable about Micronesian societies other than the one into which they were born, e.g. Palauan, Ponapean, etc. Such an observation is readily illustrated among Micronesian students enrolled in a college course on traditional and contemporary Micronesian anthropology, such as I and others have had the opportunity to teach in reecent years.

"Significant value may still attach to the employment of anthropologists (American, or foreign-trained Micronesian) to investigate areas of cultural and societal change in Micronesia as background analyses for urgently needed planning of new economic, social, political, and educational institutions by Micronesians themselves as they come to assume increasing control over their own affairs. A real possibility exists that Micronesian leaders in future will need and will decide to employ non-Micronesian anthropologists, and other social scientists, for the technical knowledge and skills they possess, just as Micronesians will presumably employ foreign lawyers, architects, and engineers where those skills are requisite to program development by Micronesians.

"The important challenge to American anthropologists who may become involved in such activity is what should be their role in the conduct of field investigations and in the decision-making and implementation which follows. To what extent can (or should) American anthropologists try to influence Micronesian decisions about Micronesian affairs, just as the former have done in the past in attempts to influence the decisions of American administrators about Micronesian affairs? Even if invited by the islanders to intervene locally, can the anthropologist as an outsider perform a viable role in the context of internal politics and decision-making among Micronesians?

"Personally, I question the right of any American anthropologist (or any American, for that matter) to tell Micronesians of whatever conviction what they should be thinking and doing about their future. In my opinion, to adopt such a role is an insult to Micronesians, for it is equivalent to declaring that Micronesians lack the capacity to decide for themselves what they want to do with their lives.

"CONCLUSION

"In viewing the future role of American anthropology in Micronesia as well as evaluating its role in the past, I believe it essential to keep in mind that each anthropologist is first a human being, with his own family culture, his own beliefs about his obligations to his country and to humanity, his own experience with anthropological training in the graduate schools attended, his own abilities to relate to other people be they Micronesian or American in a fieldwork situation, and his own evaluation of his responsibilities as an anthropologist. What performance he will produce in the field (or what he might be expected to produce) cannot be dictated by the fact of his profession as

(MASON, continued)
anthropologist or of his nationality as American. It is a complex thing which must be worked out by each individual according to the conditions under which he is working and how he responds at the time.

"Generalizations about appropriate behavior for anthropologists in Micronesia may be verbalized by Roger Gale, or by me, or by anyone else, but the final performance will emerge for better or for worse from the uniqueness of each anthropologist, from the individual person that he is. Under those circumstances, guidelines should be established, perhaps at this symposium, but I believe that the result in the field will be determined inevitably as a personal choice. We can only hope that the choice will be based on common sense and an awareness of all the circumstances, toward a performance which will reflect well on the integrity of the field worker and the dignity of the Micronesian community."

(Editor's Note: Your reactions to the two papers reproduced here are invited for inclusion in future issues of the Newsletter. Send them to the Editor, Leonard Mason, 5234 Keakealani St., Honolulu, HI 96821.)

AAM ELECTION RESULTS

The AAM Secretary reports that Kathy Kesolei and Walter Scott Wilson received the most votes in recent balloting by AAM members to fill the two vacancies on the Executive Committee.

Miss Kesolei is a Trust Territory citizen from Palau. She studied anthropology at the University of Guam, and has done research on Palauan customs and folklore. She is presently continuing her studies in anthropology at the University of Hawaii on an East-West Center scholarship. She will replace William Alkire, University of Victoria, whose term on the Executive Committee expired.

Dr. Wilson was re-elected to the Executive Committee, and will continue to serve as Secretary for AAM. He is a U.S. citizen who resides on Guam. He has a Ph. D. in Anthropology from the University of Pennsylvania, and has done research on Kusaie and other islands in Micronesia. He is presently Chairman of the Behavioral Science faculty at the University of Guam.

With this issue of the Newsletter we are beginning to remove names and addresses from our mailing list, where we have not had an indication from readers of their wish to continue receiving the Newsletter. If you have not already returned a form similar to that reproduced below, please do so immediately in order to insure that your name will be retained on our mailing list for future issues.

If you have not yet made a contribution, you are invited to do so by filling in the form below and sending your contribution directly to the AAM Secretariat. If you have already made a contribution, it is not necessary to make another one at this time. (We expect, in the Fall '73 issue, to announce a shift from cash contributions to regular dues for support of the Newsletter.)

_____I do not care to make a contribution at this time, but would like to have my name kept on the AAM mailing list.

_____I wish to make a contribution in the amount of _____. (Make your check payable to "Association for Anthropology in Micronesia.")

My present field of interest (occupation, etc.) is_____

My experience in Micronesia consists of_____

Mailing address: Name_____

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(note zipcode if in USA)

RONGELAP LEUKEMIA VICTIM DEAD

In the last AAM Newsletter (Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 26), readers were urged to send "get-well" cards to Lekoj Anjain, 19-year old Rongelapese. At the date of that writing, Lekoj was suffering from acute myelogenous leukemia, and was being treated at the U. S. National Institutes of Health in Bethesda, Maryland.

Only a few days later, November 15th, Lekoj Anjain died of leukemia induced by exposure on Rongelap to fallout from the H-bomb blast on Bikini in March, 1954. His body has been returned to the Marshall islands for burial.

Further details have been reported in the Friends of Micronesia Newsletter, Vol. 3, No. 1, Winter 1973, p. 3.

PACE PROJECT ON ENIWETOK CANCELLED

According to a Defense Department release, June 11, 1973, the Air Force plan to conduct high-explosive cratering experiments on Eniwetok (see AAM Newsletter, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 15-16) is cancelled.

"A recent review of the PACE program, incorporating an analysis of new scientific data, concerns of the citizens of Eniwetok, and environmental considerations, resulted in a decision that the cratering explosions (known as PACE 2) would not be carried out on Eniwetok Atoll in the Marshall Islands.

"Instead, a thorough geological study of the island, which was formerly called PACE 1, will be carried out under the name EXPOE (Exploratory Program on Eniwetok). It will include seismic refraction surveys and core drilling, both standard geological exploration techniques. One CIST (Cavity In Situ Test), non cratering, mild explosive experiment (200 pounds) will also be included in EXPOE.

"Representatives of the people of Eniwetok have observed these techniques in use and have no objections to them. The parties involved in the lawsuit against the U. S. Air Force have agreed to dismissal of the suit."

The "representatives" noted above were Mr. Smith Gideon, Magistrate of Ujelang, Mr. Theodore Mitchell, Director, Micronesian Legal Services, and Mr. Hemos Jack, interpreter.

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